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SYNOPSIS
Many authors have contributed to the understanding of
the nature of bureaucracy., In general, however, they
can be sorted into two major groups, those who discuss
ideal bureaucracies without problems or defects, and
those who concentrate on explanations of why and how
things go wrong.
That most organizations have symptoms of illness is
apparent to even the casual observer. However, it
should be obvious that most of these organizations do
produce some useful output. Trains and aeroplanes do
run more or less on time, the post office eventually
delivers most of the mail, automobiles and other
mechanical devices manage to run to the limited satis-
faction of most consumers.
This paper provides an understanding of why things go
right and how they can be made to go even better.
According to Parkinson, things go right when an ｯ ｲ ｧ ｡ ｮ ｩ ｺ ｾ
ation has not reached a level of sophistication or
maturity sufficient to substitute work with activity
throughout all of its levels. Peter would say that
things go right because the time delays inherent in
ii
promotion through the hierarchy delay the promotion of
competent personnel so that not every person has reached
his level of incompetence at anyone time. Thus, there
are a few competent personnel at every level at any time
to ensure that some useful work gets done. According to
both theories then, the amount of useful work is inversely
proportional to the maturity and degree of stability of
the organization. This paper, however, suggests that
even mature organizations can become comparatively
efficient when management is made incapable of inter-
fering with the useful output of subordinates.
The theory is postulated that competent workers at the
lowest level of a hierarchy know what the overall
objectives of the organization are, and proceed to do
work to meet these objectives. Competent managers,
therefore, can contribute little to the output, but
being competent can and will interfere in such a manner
that the worker spends more and more time on reports,
meetings, etc. to the detriQent of the objectives of
the organization. An incompetent manager will be
recognized by the workers as such, and thus easily can
be kept happy and busy through minimal effort on the
iii
part of the worker, thus leaving the working level free
to achieve the objectives of the organization. From
this insight comes the proposition that the worst thing
an organization possibly can do is promote its competent
personnel. They must be kept at the "work" level as
opposed to the "activity" level which must be reserved
for incompetents.
It is recognized that, in the present climate of beliefs,
this is not easy. However, through analysis of various
successful organizations and historical practices, it
becomes apparent that this approach already has been
taken in some ｯ ｲ ｧ ｡ ｮ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｮ ｳ Ｌ either consciously or
, unconsciously.
AN APPROACH TO THE HAXH1IZATION OF OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
IN A BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
Introduction
The general theory of Parkinsonian Optimalityl defines
a Parkinsonian structure as an organization which is so
occupied with a variety of internal activities, primarily
in the form of meetings, that it has very little if any
resources left available to do any "work".2 Upon
examining most bureaucratic 3 systems in government or
in large corporate entities it will be 'seen that in the
upper echelons this is very often the case but, surpris-
ingly enough, a certain amount of "work ll does get done.
1 Zelman, H.,Toward3 a General Theory of Parkinsonian
Optimality, Ottawa, 1973,
2 "V']ork II in this context is defined as a service or
the making of a product for someone outside the
organization under study.
3 Bureaucracy is used in the sense described by
Downs who defines a bureau as:-
(a) It is large
(b) A majority of its members are full time
workers who depend upon their employment
for most of their income
(c) The initial hiring of personnel, their
promotion within the bureau and their
retention therein are based, at least
partly, upon some type of assessment
of the way they have performed or can be
expected to perform their organizational
roles
This approach to the maximization of operational efficiency
in a bureaucratic organization will explain this apparent
anomaly'and suggest some criteria and guidelines for the
selection of senior executives as well as working level
subordinates to ensure that "work" continues to be done.
Continuation of footnote from p. 1
(d) The major portion of its output is not
directly or indirectly evaluated in any
markets external to the organization by
means of voluntary quid pro quo transactions.
Downs, AnthonY,Inside Bureaucracy. (Boston, Little,
Brown and Company, 1967)
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Analysis
It can be demonstrated by probability theory that if a
superior wishes to convey general instructions (as opposed
to orders) to a subordinate, and we define this in terms
4of a relevant message of length n in a speech of length
N, and if we assume some percentage of loss uniformly
across the entire speech, then the probability of receipt
of a correct message decreases as N increases.
n
Basically, there are four main groups of losses in the
message content. First of all, since the subordinate
cannot possibly maintain 100% attention during a lengthy
discourse, automatically he will lose some part of the
total.content and thus there is a probability of losing
part of the message. Secondly, if the discourse is long
enough there is a reasonable probability that, even if
all the bits of information survive, they will be so
mixed up that a part of the message content will be lost.
4 Speech in this context will include written
communications although it is recognized that the
probability of message loss is less with written
communication than ,·Ii th oral. On the other hand,
it may be argued that a ''iritten communication is
more likely to be nisunderstood because of the
absence of body language and instantaneous feedback.
-4-
Thirdly, the recipient may make an error in deciding
which part of the speech is the message. Fourthly,
since many words have multiple meanings, some contradic-
tory, the recipient of the message may impute a false
meaning to the message.
This paper does not include a detailed mathematical
analysis of the probability of a message getting through
from one 1eve1.in the hierarchy to the next level down.
However, it can be demonstrated tpat the probability of
a useful instruction from the chief executive of an
organization arriving at the working level is virtually
'1 5n1 . Since senior personnel then see that the organiz-
ation does not function in accordance with their wishes,
reports will be demanded, meetings will be set up and
more activities (as opposed to Ｇ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｫ Ｂ Ｉ will be generated.
5 See "The cumulative effects of authority leakage"
Downs - op. cit - pp. 134-136, also G. Tullock -
"The Politics of ｂ ｵ ｲ ･ ｡ ｵ ｣ ｲ ｡ ｣ ｹ ｾ ｰ ｰ Ｎ 142-193
(Washington D.C. Public Affairs Press 1965)
.'
-5-
This would be expected to result in lower operational
efficiencies6 and -finally - complete chaos.
And yet, surprisingly enough, this does not happen, and
therefore we must ask ourselves what autogenous healing
mechanisms exist in large bureaucratic organizations to
arrest or possibly reverse this apparently inevitable
slide into chaos.
Perhaps the best explanation is in accordance with
7McGregor's Theory Y that people are essentially honest
and reliable and want to do a good job. Thus at the
working level the staff are highly output oriented and
will do their best to do a good job as they .see their
job to be. Since most large organizations have an
apparently inherent objective stated in the name of the
6 Operational efficiency has been defined as:-
Number of man hours available for "work ll in
the organization
Total number of man hours available for all
purposes in the organization
7 McGregor, Douglas, The Human Side of Enterprise
(NY, McGraW-Hill, 1960). McGregor's theory Y is
based on the need for mutual realization of both
individual and organizational goals.
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organization, the staff at the working level do not have
too much difficulty in developing a realization or
appreciation of their mission within their organization.
For example, the employee of a large telephone company
would see his function as maintaining and/or improving
telephone communications no matter what broad national
policy issues are being publicly debated by the president
of his company. Similarly, the employee of a railroad
company presumably has developed a general idea that the
function of the organization which employs him is to run
a railroad and therefore he will do whatever he can to
contribute to such an ｯ ｢ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ Ｎ ｾ
It easily can be observed that in most large organizations
the staff at the working level look on company policies,
administrative regulations and such like as being con-
straints on their operations and very often will do their
utmost to bend the regulations when they interfere with
8 In this context, it becorr.es very interesting to
consider the implication of a corporate name
change which very often today does not reflect
any kind of function for ｴ ｾ ･ organization. The
current business literature has many exanples
of corporate name changes which try to give an
identity to the diversity of an organization
rather than illustrating its particular function.
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the efficient carrying out of operations. 9
If this.is really the nature of the large bureaucratic
organization one then should look for optimum tactics
and policies to maximize this potential efficiency at
the working level. Since the habit of bending or by-
passing administrative regulations, policy guidelines,
etc. is already well ingrained at the working level, one
immediate solution presents itself. At the present time,
one of the difficulties encountered in the process of
bending regulations to suit operational needs is that
the staff at the working level must be careful about
being found out at some time in the future since top
management, even when having very little real, authority
1 . '11 h h . h 10to contro operat10ns, st1 may ave t e power to pun1s •
9 See The Law of Counter Control - Downs - Ope cit -
p. 147. This law' states that "The greater the
effort made by a sovereign or top level official
to control the behavior of subordinate officials,
the greater the efforts made by those subordinates
to evade or counteract such control".
10 It is interesting to note that, with the advent
of collective bargaining in most organizations,
management genErally has lost the .effective
power to punish for incompetence but has retained
the power to punish for formal insubordination.
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Thus, if one takes care to appoint obvious incompetents
at the very top of an organization, the staff at the
working level will have some confidence that their
"misdeeds" will not be found out and thus they will be
able to go ahead with their operations of providing a
service to someone without any worries about repercussions
from above. ll
However, it must be remembered that in most real life
organizations the formal chief executive in reality has
very little or no influence on day to day operations at
11 In this context some of the recent events in the
U.S. Department of Justice may be cited as an
example. To quote: "The loyalty that was
envinced was to neither a man nor an Administration
but to an Institution .••• But the Department of
Justice is an uncommon institution, a peculiar
mix of legal responsibilities and political
discretion which "derives its strength", as one
thirty year veteran puts it "from the fact that
it "is an agency which has never really been
managed". It has survived the best and the
worst of leaders."
The Undoing of the Justice Department, After the
Saturday Night Hassacre: - Sandford J. Ungar -
Atlantic Monthly, January 1974, p. 30.
.-
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the working level12 and the real problem lies in
providing some protection from interference by middle
and upper middle management.
This then opens up the entire problem of staffing an
organization in such a way that its "work" type of
activities can be carried out efficiently while its
hierarchical superstructure is inherently powerless
to interfere with the work output. At.the present time,
the most popular and accepted methods of staff selection
in large organizations are:
1) Competitive examinations
2) 1 · b . 13Eva uatlon ｾ supervlsors
12 See Tullock - op. cit., and Downs - op. cit., for
excellent discussions regarding diminishing control
in large bureaucracies and the impact of competing
personal objectives on chains of authority.
13 Selection by nepotisQ, while recognized as a fact
of life, will not be discussed here because pre-
vailing social attitudes frown on this type of
personnel selection. Nevertheless, it may be use-
ful to reintroduce a form of intellectual nepotism
to ensure that the most senior executives are
"obviously" suited to their positions. It must be
remembered that ｾ ｨ ｩ ｬ ･ competents who are promoted
from the working level carry a certain amount of
goodwill and trust with them to delay their
demonstration of incompetence or irrelevance, the
converse is also true. An obvious nepotistic
appointment starts with a fund of mistrust which
ｾ Ｎ ｙ Ｎ Ｇ Ｂ 1 1 ｲＢＭｬＧｾ ｦＢＢＧＧＧＮ［ＬＬｾｲｳｾＮ｣ＨＱＰｾＬＧＱ ｾＺＺＮｾＬ DC'': c- ｾ tjl e ｃｏｔｲｾＢＢＢＧＢ＿ＢＺＸｮ｣･Ｎ
ｾｬｏＭ
However the basic problem remains that the only valid
examination for competence in a new position is the
actual performance of the duties of that position.
Thus, any competitive examination is an exercise in
clairvoyance based on an analogy to a future reality.
Except in the ｣ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｬ ｹ rare situation of the
formal confirmation of an existing position, the same
argument applies to evaluation by supervisors.
Therefore, it can be said that successful candidates
for promotion have not necessarily satisfied the
requirements of their new positions but, instead, have
exhibited an ability to satisfy the criteria for the
analogous, or shadow position posited by the selection
method. Thus, at the very least, successful candidates
must be "practical psychologists" with an ability to out-
guess the evaluators and simulate the desired behavior
which, in all probability, is not correlated to anything
outside the evaluation situation. Traditionally, this
desired behavior has been labelled "competence" and it
is the thesis of this paper that a redefinition of this
term may achieve the organization objective of
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operational efficiency.14
Since we seek operational efficiency at the working level
it becomes evident that efficient workers never should be
promoted and this then suggests a basic principle, namely:-
Promotion should only be based on demonstrated incompetence. lS
It is appreciated that this approach obviates the problems
associated with the normal operation of the classic Peter
Principle which states that in a bureaucracy man will rise
t h ' 1 1 f' 16o 1S eve 0 1ncompetence. In the opinion of the
14 I am indebted for this insight to Prof.K. Wilson of
Queen's University who kindly reviewed an early draft
of this paper.
IS This has been defined as the Retep Principle and
will be referred to in this way from now on in this
paper. It should be noted thai "incompetence" is
used here in an objective sense. i.e. incompetent
to carry out the function defined by organizational
need. This capability or lack of capability then
is relabelled "competence" in a subjective sense
for staffing purposes. See supra pp. 9 and 10
16 See Peter, Laurence J., and Hull, Raymond, -
The Peter Principle: ｾ ｬ ｨ ｹ Things Always Go Mrong
(New York, Bantam Books Inc. 1969)
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author of this paper, the Peter Principle presupposes a
quasi-passive system of management where people who are
competent in a particular function automatically will be
promoted until they reach their level of incompetence.
The Retep Principle however, states that, for an efficient
organization, competent people never will be promoted,
while the only basis for promotion will be demonstrated
incompetence. Thus, only the obviously incompetent clerks
will be promoted to the officer or management level, the
most obviously incompetent officer will be made a section
head, the most obviously incompetent section head a division
chief, etc.
Such an approach would lead to some immediate and direct
benefits. The analysis leading to the Parkinsonian
Optimality theory17 clearly demonstrates that middle
ｭ ｡ ｮ ｡ ｧ ･ ｭ ･ ｮ ｾ has very little if any time for intelligently
directing the work of subordinates at the working level.
Earlier in this paper it was pointed out that the
probability of receiving a valid instruction at the
17 Ope cit.
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working level is very close to zero. However, when a
competent member of the working level staff is promoted,
for example to section head, he ｾ ｡ ｲ ｲ ｩ ･ ｳ with him a certain
amount of respect from his previous colleagues. They
will assume that, although most of the people in middle
management are ｩ ｮ ｣ ｾ ｭ ｰ ･ ｴ ･ ｮ ｴ Ｌ their erstwhile colleague,
on the basis of his past demonstrated competence, must be
different. Thus the working level staff will begin by
accepting the instructions and advice of the new manager
in the honest belief that the real quality of management
now has chanqed. 19
It will not be until some distance along the "unlearning
curve" that it generally will be recognized that whatever
his previous merits, their erstwhile colleague is, possibly
not by his own fault, as irrelevant, if not as incompetent
as his current colleagues.
18 supra p. 4
19 As an irreverent aside one might compare this to
an old definition of marriage as IIA triumph of
hope over experience."
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This entire problem can be avoided by promoting obvious
incompetents who do not carry with them any capital of
good ｷ ｩ ｬ ｾ and understanding. They, therefore, will be
ignored by their erstwhile colleagues from the first day
of their appointment thus causing no interference with
working level operations.
Two main arguments may be advanced against this basic
proposition. First of all, one may argue that all one
needs to do is appoint a competent and energetic chief
executive who promptly will re-direct the entire organi-
zation to ensure that it does precisely what needs to be
done in the most efficient manner possible. Simple logic
of course indicates that this argument will not stand up.
If a competent chief executive is introduced to an
organization he, presumably, would start off by doing
some thinking about the organization and probably would
demand a variety of reports about the objectives of the
organization, its current status, etc. from his immediate
subordinates. Since these high level reports ｡ ｾ ･
basically aggregations of sub-section reports, the first
and most immediate impact will be a demand for new kinds
of data from the working level and this will bite into
the available amount of time to carry out "work". When
these suitably distorted aggregations finally arrive on
the ｣ ｨ ｩ ･ ｾ executive's desk, presumably he will issue some
orders and, as a competent chief executive, will want to
ensure that his orders are being carried out. Thus the
arrival of randomized instructions20 from above with the
requirement of further reports will confuse the working
level even more and thus turn an existing stable situation
into a completely chaotic one.
'0 Jt ｾ ｾ ｮ ｨ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｭ Ｐ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｔ ｡ ｾ ｰ ､ ｴ ｨ ｾ ｴ if theTA iR a mAssagA
content loss between any two levels in the hierarchy
of an organization, say between a superior and several
ｳ ｵ ｢ ｯ ｲ ､ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｴ ･ ｳ ｾ there is a high probability that the
perceived message received by each subordinate will
be different. Continuing this process down the line
to the bottom of the middle management layer,.there
is then a high probability of every manager at this
level having a different idea of his information
requirements from the working level and his instruc-
tions to that level. Since, in general, the working
leve+ officer receives operational direction from his
direct superior but also functional direction from
other managers (such as accounting, administration,
capital asset utilization, etc.) he must try and
develop a rational interpretation of this Qass of
instructions to translate them into action. As
previously stated, the probability of getting a true
message at the working level approaches ｺ ｾ ｲ ｯ and thus,
as a corollary, the probability of multiple messages
having a random distribution approaches 100%.
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The other criticism against the Retep Principle is that,
whether the chief executive is competent or incompetent,
he will not accept the idea of not having any control over
his organization. This again can be countered by a very
simple analogy from nature. It has long been observed that
migratory birds of some species fly in a V formation in
their annual migrations and it has always been argued that
there is a natural structure" of leadership with a senior,
more mature, or wiser bird taking the lead and showing
his flock where they ought to be going. With the advent
of modern photographic methods however, many flights
of migratory birds were recorded and soon it became
evident that the only distinguishing ｣ ｨ ｡ ｲ ｡ ｣ ｴ ･ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣
of the bird flying at the apex of the V formation was
that he or she liked flying at the apex of "the V formation.
Major changes of direction seemed to be originated by a
group decision which caused the entire ｦ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ to veer
to the right or left, sometimes leaving the "leader" to
continue on his own in the previous direction. I'llien the
leader peers over one shoulder and sees that there is
nobody following, he then will turn sharply and fly as
fast as possible until he gets back to the point of the
formation when, once again, he will proceed to fly
merrtly along.
-17-
The human analogy to this organizational structure is
that the chief executive of an organization which is
generally recognized as being efficient and doing a good
job of carrying out its responsibilities will assume, as
a matter of course, that it is his wise and enlightened
leadership that is causing this to happen. Therefore
he will not demand excessive reports nor give too many
orders. As a general rule one would expect the chief
executive of such an organization to take a personal
interest in awarding long service pins, gold watches on
retirement, personally attending staff parties, encouraging
charity drives, etc. Further, one would expect such a
chief executive to concern himself with macro policy
ｾ problems, broad national objectives, etc.
However, there is the problem of co-ordinating the
activities of members of the working level. In most
organizations this co-ordinating function begets a
planning function, then a policy function, then a
directing function, then an audit function, etc. This
hierarchy then begets a number of committees, i,e.
executive committee, management committee, co-ordinating
committee, policy committee, etc. Thus we appear to have
-18-
demonstrated the need for a Parkinsonian structure which
will inevitably lead back to the presently existing
type of bureaucracy.
There are a number of theories which attempt to explain
why this apparently inevitable process does not occur.
Peter's analysis suggests that the introduction of
class barriers into a hierarchy greatly retards the
growth of organizational incompetence and may in fact
t .. d f' . 1 21 S . b f thpos pone 1t 1n e 1n1te y. 1nce mem ers 0 e
subordinate class are restricted from entry into the
higher ranks, they find little opportunity to advance
to their level of ｩ ｮ ｣ ｯ ｾ ｰ ･ ｴ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｎ
22Tracy suggests that in our society women form just
such a subordinate class. As a specific, he cites
the example of secretaries who cannot be promoted to
the management levels no matter how competent they are.
21 "The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go
Wrong - Op. cit. - pp. 62-64
22 Lane Tracy - Postscript to the Peter Principle -
Harvard Business Review - Boston - July/August 1972
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Although there are ranks within the class of secretaries,
i.e. file clerks, typists, stenographers, receptionists,
etc. they are not in a truly hierarchical relation to
each other. Thus, a promotion for a secretary means a
marginal increase in salary, (generally less than the
difference between her ex-superior and the newer, more
senior superior) considerably more responsibility and
work BUT no increase in formal authority. Consequently
the authority.structure provides no m9tivation to try
23
and rise in the hierarchy. Tracy. describes this
relationship between secretaries as a horizontal
hierarchy which is defined as "a hierarchy which contains
many positions which are all on the same level of
authority."
This insight may perhaps explain how working organizations
actually satisfy their needs for co-ordination, policy
planning, etc. First and foremost, of course, we have
the parahierarchy of secretaries who know what really is
happening and can transmit real information among
working groups under the nominal direction of the
23 Ope cit.
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executives. Then there are administrative assistants,
filing clerks, etc. who have tremendous ranges of
knowledse about the operations of the organization.
When one considers the very large proportion of women
in these activities, and the demonstrated capabilities
of most women in running complex households, this
explanation becomes overwhelmingly attractive. The
verification of this hypothesis however must be left
to other researchers. 24
The ｲ ･ ｾ ｬ ､ ｩ ｦ ｦ ｩ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｹ in ｩ ｾ ｲ ｬ ･ ｭ ｾ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｾ the ｾ Ｐ ｲ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｾ ｬ
Retep Principle of organizational structure is, of course,
the requirement for an entirely different philosophy
and basis of judgement for the personnel community or
group in the organization. Basically there are two
approaches one might take to solve this problem. First
of all, if one assumes· that the external directing group,
24 This hypothesis however forces us to re-examine the
entire concept of women's liberation and sexual
equality. If WOQen are to be allowed to compete
freely for the most senior positions, there would
be a real danger of WOMen also rising to their level
of incompetence and destroying the competent
parahierarchy which now maintains most organizations.
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such as the board of directors, recognize the validity
of this approach they may recruit a very small core of
people \vith similar beliefs who then will make suitable
appointments to their own staff with guidelines for
"competence" carefully defined so that only incompetents
25
may be promoted. In case it is thought that this is
completely impossible, it must be remembered that one
of the basic precepts of organization is that:
"Rank is a matter of fact, . 26
competence is a matter of opinion."
There is still the problem of possible discontent at
the working level if all promotions are restricted to
obvious incompetents. It is suggested that this can
. easily be solved by making salaries and "perks" at
the working level directly output related and allowing,
or deliberately creating, very large salary overlaps
between ｴ ｾ ･ highest working levels and management.
Thus, the outstanding producers at the working level
well might have a higher salary, better furniture,
25 See supra p. 10
26 Part of dogma developed by Systems Analysis Group,.
Treasury Board, 1969.
-22-
more freedom, etc. than their nominal superior in the
management level. This already is the case with some
ｰ ｲ ｯ ｦ ｣ ｳ ｳ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ ｳ in large organizations as well as sales
personnel on commission and so the principle is well
established. It only remains to broaden the utilization
of this approach across the entire organization.
An alternative tactic would be to place very heavy
emphasis on personal suitability in the 3ubjective
sense on all candidates for promotion to middle manage-
ment with a very low emphasis on technical or operational
competence. Thus one might require that everybody at
middle management level must have a good understanding
of the classics and an appreciation of history. For
many years it was believed that this was the preferred
method of producing broad minded managers as opposed
t h h . 1· 27 C 'd· ho t e muc more narrow ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｾ ｡ ｾ ｳ ｴ ｳ Ｎ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｾ ･ ｲ ｾ ｮ ｧ t e
27 This might help explain the observed fact that new
industries achieve quite remarkable effectiveness
while often appearing to be inefficient. As the
industry matures, it develops and promotes experts,
becomes less effective and appears more efficient.
This has been discussed brilliantly by C. Northcote
Parkinson in his books "The LaY] and the Profits"
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company 1960) and
"Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration"
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957)
-23-
normal cycle in managerial philosophy it should not be
too difficult once again to introduce these kind of
concepts within large organizations.
Another method which has historical backing in many
organizations is to promote only by seniority. If this
system is followed rigorously, the competent colleagues
of the person promoted can have no valid enforceable
objections and will not fall into the' trap previously
mentioned of assuming that management is becoming more
competent. There may be some occasional loss when the
most competent employee is also the most senior but, as
he knows that he is being promoted on seniority only,
he will have a tendency to regard his promotion as a
reward for past services and a sort of pre-retirement
bonus. In most cases, therefore, the promoted employee
will prefer to relax in the new position and enjoy the
honestly earned reward rather than interfere.
"Promotion by seniority", in almost all ｣ ｡ ｳ ･ ｾ Ｌ can
support the Retep principle if it is coupled with
"pay by ｾ ｯ ｭ ｰ ･ ｴ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ Ｎ Ｂ ｔ ｨ ｵ ｳ ｾ if' the most senior employee
is also the most competent but is not due to retire soon,
-24-
he may refuse the promotion and accept .greater pay in-
stead. The promotion then going to the next senior and
so on until the least competent is promoted.
The use of this method throughout the hierarchy could
of course result in a rapid turnover of personnel at
the most senior levels because of age. If this is
considered to be a serious disadvantage for cosmetic
28
reasons, it ,may be combined with the previously
suggested method of insisting that middle and higher
level managers be schooled in the classics, philosophy,
I , , l' h' d ' d' '1' 29po ltlca SClence or ot er rlgorous aca emlC lSC1P lne.
There is still one possible major problem to be faced
in the application of the Retep ｐ ｲ ｩ ｮ ｣ ｩ ｰ ｬ ･ ｾ Inevitably
and by accident an incompetent will be promoted to his
level of competence. This can occur because many top
flight managers are actually very poor at dealing with
routine operations.
28 For practical efficiency reasons, it would obviously
be an advantage,since a senior executive vlho retires
before he can possibly become familiar with his job
is most unlikely to interfere in operations.
29 I am indebted for the thought on the efficiency of
the ｾ Ｈ ｭ ｩ ｃ Ｇ ｲ ｩ ｴ ｹ f:ystc-rTl t.0 ｾ Ｎ Ｌ C'ollC'2cue J. ｾ ｾ Ｚ Ｍ ＾ Ｎ ｣ ｌ Ｂ Ｇ ｣ Ｈ ｬ '·'ho
1, ..: ..... ｾ Ｌ ,
• 4 .. ｾ .. • _ • ｾ • _. T Ｍｾ : ｾ '. ｾ • '.. ｾ .. ｾＮ ｾＢ '. '.. -'
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Obviously this danger must be guarded against by the
personnel group, but failures do occur since latent
capabilities are not always recognized. The solution
to this problem is, of necessity, drastic since the
"accidental competent" (A.C.) could seriously endanger
the entire organization.
A first approach might be to interest or direct the
A.C. into a major policy issue such as the influence
of GATT on Women's Rights, etc. If the A.C. is really
c:+-"rl., +-ho o.f'.f'i ioT'l"'u
- ..... _w,-"",,,,,, _.-'- _4 _ •• _.J.
of the policy making process. If these solutions do not
work, the directors of the organization are left with
only two choices. If the A.C. is a good manager but
lacks thebasic insight to appreciate the Retep Principle,
he must be fired "for insubordination" a charge that
can be enforced in most bureaucratic ｯ ｲ ｧ ｡ ｮ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ Ｎ ｾ ｏ
However, if he does have the necessary insight, he is
a rare bird indeed and must be co-opted into the group
30 supra p. 7
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f d ' 31o ｾｲ･｣ｴｯｲｳＮ
There is always the possibility that the A.C. may be
a "climber" as described by DO\'lns, 32 whose main
objectives are the achievement of high position with
its concomitant high salary, prestige, etc. As a
climber, he therefore will simulate "competence" as
defined by the organization and, if successful in this
simulation, ｷ ｾ ｬ ｬ be promoted to the highest levels.
Since by Dovms' definition the climber is concerned
only with the organization's objectives to the extent
that they parallel his own personal objectives, it
is not in the climber's interest to "rock the boat"
by attacking the philosophical underpinnings of the
31 It has been suggested by Woodside (Ministry of
State for Urban Affairs - Ottawa - Private
Communication) that the Peter Principle might be
invoked to promote the A.C. to his level of .
ｩｮ｣ｯｾｰ･ｴ･ｮ｣･ and thus maintain stability in the
organization. This hoYever, brings up the
horrifying possibility of the innate top flight
manager who is progressively more competent as he
moves UP the orqanization. As demonstrated
previously, he could destroy the organization if
placed in a position of power and thus this
alternative solution is not accepted by the author
of this paper
32 Inside Bureaucracy - Ope cit - pp. 92-96
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organization or its personnel policy. Thus, the only
real danger lies in the idealist who believes in the
general philosophies of management taught in the more
common texts and who has enough competence to seriously
endanger the organization if allowed his head.
It may be argued that the kind of organizational structure
suggested is unstable and could be remedied by a management
group change ｡ ｾ opposed to a change of chief executives
only. This argument however ignores two vital protective
mechanisms existing in every oraanization -
a) The self justification syndrome requires
middle management to defend the status quo
since, after all, they were promoted on the
basis of this definition of "competence."
b) Newton's third law which states that "for every
action there is an equal and opposite ｲ ･ ｡ ｣ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ Ｂ
Thus the competent working level employees will
not only bend regulations but will actively
build defence mechanisms. Given the relative
levels of competence, this puts the middle
manager in a "no win" position.
-28-
Combining these two mechanisms it becomes evident that
even an efficient top management group can do very little
more than disrupt the organization and thus reduce
operational efficiencies.
-29-
Summary
Considering the fact that many large organizations are
neither led nor guided by their management and that
most relevant work or services delivered outside the
organizafion is carried out by self-motivated individuals
at the working level, it becomes important to provide
the working level with as much autonomy as possible.
This can be achieved by following the Retep Principle
which states that:
"Promotion should only be on
demonstrated incompetence"
At the same time, to initiate the changes necessary in
managerial structure and eliminate the deleterious
effects of partially competent management it is necessary
to appoint an obviously incompetent chief executive.
This will ensure that the staff at the working level
will pay no attention whatsoever to policy guidelines
or administrative directives and will get on quietly
with carrying out the basic functions of the organization.
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